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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BIG COTTONWOOD TANNER DITCH ] 
COMPANY, a corporation, ] 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal ] 
corporation, 
Defendant and 
Petitioner. ] 
> RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
1 PETITION FOR CERTIORARI 
I Case No. 870432 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Pursuant to Rule 45(3) of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Courtf the Defendant-Petitioner (hereinafter the 
"City") asserts that the Utah Court of Appeals departed so far 
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as 
to call for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision. 
Plaintiff-Respondent (hereinafter the "Company") asserts that 
such assertion is without merit. 
The City asserts the following grounds for its 
Petition: 
1. Did the Court fail to give equity to the City 
in solving one widow's financial problem by 
reconstructing the contracts between the parties to 
shift the burden of such financial obligation from her 
to the Defendant City's ratepayers, contrary to the 
agreement and the 64-year course of the dealing of the 
parties. 
2. Did the Court err in asserting that the owners 
of stock in the Plaintiff were immune from the 
requirements of paragraph IV and L of the agreement of 
1965. 
3. Did the Court fail to decide the ambiguities 
in the contracts against the Plaintiff and give 
consideration to estoppel and laches which should have 
applied in this case. 
The Company asserts in response: 
a. None of the Courts "solved" one widow's 
financial problems, but declaratory relief was sought 
and obtained as to the respective rights of the City 
and of the Company. 
b. The provisions of paragraph IV and L of the 
1965 Agreement apply to "private lines" owned by 
"private parties" and not to the "Company system." 
c. There are no ambiguities in the contracts and 
any resort to estoppel and laches are without merit. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Rule 43(3) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
provides for certiorari if the Court of Appeals has rendered a 
decision which has so far departed from the accepted and usual 
-2-
course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of 
this Court's power of supervision. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The District Court rendered a Declaratory Judgment 
interpreting the two Agreements between the parties dated 
January 2, 1920 and July 27, 1965 in favor of the City. The 
Company appealed the District Court Judgment. 
The Court of Appeals held that the City had the 
responsibility of maintaining the entire Company system. The 
Opinion of the Court of Appeals, filed August 12, 1987, is 
attached as part of the appendix. The City filed a Petition 
for Certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Contrary to the assertions of the City in its 
Petition, the facts have been misstated and it is necessary 
therefore to properly state the facts. 
1. Salt Lake City Corporation is a municipal 
corporation of the first class of the State of Utah. 
2. Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company is a Utah 
corporation serving its stockholders culinary and irrigation 
water. 
3. In 1920, an Agreement was entered into between the 
Company and the City wherein: 
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a. The City agreed to maintain only the "Mains" 
(paragraph 11). 
b. The City was to furnish certain grades and 
quantity of pipe to the Company for the Company to 
install from the "Mains" to its stockholders 
(paragraphs 7 and 8). 
c. The Company shall be responsible for the 
maintenance of 'hydrants and other parts of said 
system except that part thereof defined as the 
"Mains"1 (paragraph 10). 
d. The Company would furnish to the City certain 
water (paragraph 1). 
e. The City was in turn to furnish a lesser 
amount of culinary water to the Company, and certain 
amounts of irrigation water to the Company (paragraphs 
3, 5 and 6). 
f. The City was to construct part of the system 
from the "Mains" to the property lines of each owner 
together with shut-off valves (paragraph 9). 
g. There is a forfeiture provision in the event 
the City fails to perform and the Company is entitled 
to "retake . . . the said water . . . as if this 
contract had not been made" (paragraph 13). 
4. There arose a dispute between the Company and the 
City as to performance and a lawsuit was filed by the Company 
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against the City, Civil No. 105968. This lawsuit was settled 
by entering into the 1965 Agreement. 
5. The 1965 Agreement provides in pertinent part: 
a. The City is to install a booster pump, divert 
additional water to the Company, remove a regulator, 
install a by-pass regulator, and install a four-inch 
system valve on Fardown Ave. (paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 
4). 
b. The City, at the Company's expense, was to 
complete certain improvements and water lines (page 2, 
paragraphs (a) through (g)). 
c. The City was to insure unrestricted flow and 
unhampered pressure even of if the City used master 
meters (page 2, paragraph I). 
d. To maintain and operate at its own cost and 
expense all of the Company system (page 3, paragraph 
III) . 
e. To take over with consent of the private 
owners, their private lines (not the Company system). 
The City will maintain the private lines upon an 
agreement with the private parties (not the Company) 
(page 3, paragraph IV). 
f. The Company agreed to give to the City a list 
of the Company stockholders and to update that list 
from time to time (page 3, paragraph 1). 
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g. For purposes of billing the individual 
stockholders of the Companyf the City shall read 
semi-annually meter readings at the point of use of 
the respective individual users (page 4, paragraph E). 
h. The City shall have the right to require 
reasonable repair of private lines and individual 
service lines and bill the private owners therefor 
(page 5, paragraph L). 
6. The 1920 Agreement is ratified, affirmed and in 
full force and effect except as specifically changed, modified 
or amended in the 1965 Agreement. 
7. The District Court made no findings of facts but 
held on May 1, 1984 that based upon the Agreements as a whole, 
the City was responsible for maintaining the "mains" only. 
8. The Court of Appeals on August 12, 1987 reversed 
the District Court. 
9. A Petition for Rehearing was filed with the Court 
of Appeals August 24, 1987. 
10. The Petition for Rehearing was denied October 13, 
1987. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT WHICH ESTABLISHED 
THE RIGHTS OF THE CITY AND THE COMPANY IS 
APPROPRIATE 
The Companyf in 1920f sought to obtain culinary and 
domestic water for its purpose and use by its stockholders. To 
this endf it established a "Company System." The City was to 
deliver water to the Company: 
Provided, that said water . . . be delivered 
upon the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch System 
as at present constructed, and in such way 
and manner and in such quantities, that each 
stockholder or user on the system shall be 
enabled under the distribution of said water 
to which he is entitled or to which he may 
be entitled by virtue of his shares or 
proportion in the Company or ditch system 
and under the system of distribution of said 
irrigation water whether distributed by the 
rotation system or otherwise (page 3, 
paragraph 3 of 1920 Agreement) (emphasis 
supplied). 
again at paragraph 4 of the 1920 Agreement: 
The City shall properly construct and 
perpetually and properly maintain a system 
of water pipes of such size, quality, 
capacity and kind, (and so proportioned as 
to size and manner of construction as to 
accord with the accepted standards of 
engineering) that will efficiently carry, 
regulate, and distribute the water over the 
area served by the Big Cottonwood Tanner 
Ditch Company's System for culinary, 
domestic or other use ai herein provided 
(emphasis supplied). 
At paragraph 5 of the 1920 Agreement: 
Said "culinary water" shall be furnished and 
delivered through said pipe line system in a 
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continuous flow during the time and in the 
quantity herein stated. The said culinary 
water to be furnished and delivered through 
said Pipe line or system is that reserved to 
the Company out of its proportion of said 
Big Cottonwood Creek . . .(emphasis 
supplied). 
At paragraph 6 of the 1920 Agreement: 
In the event that during any interval or 
period of time, the Company shall not 
require through said pipe line or water 
system the use of the total quantity of" 
water herein reserved and provided for 
culinary use, (it being understood by both 
parties that the pipe line shall be so 
constructed and maintained that the 
community growth and development will not be 
hindered, delayed or jeopardized (emphasis 
supplied). 
At paragraph 7 of the 1920 Agreement: 
That in addition to the pipe line agreed to 
be constructed and maintained as herein set 
forth, the City shall furnish to the Company 
galvanized iron pipe in sizes from one to 
two inches in diameter as the necessity of 
the case may require, sufficient to 
construct such lines and convey the water 
from the part of the system hereinafter 
defined as the "Mains" to the property line 
nearest the street of all persons upon the 
system of the Company whose property cfoes 
not abut on the streets along which the 
"Mains" are to be laid (emphasis supplied). 
Paragraph 10 of the 1920 Agreement provides: 
After installation, the Company shall 
maintain said hydrants and other parts ol 
said system except that part thereof defined 
as the "Mains" (emphasis supplied). 
It is apparent that the 1920 Agreement made only two 
distinctions. They are: 
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MAINS, as defined by specified location in 
paragraph 20. 
and, 
The Company Systemf meaning all lines 
including Mains, which delivered water to 
the Company stockholders. 
It is clear under the 1920 Agreement that the Company 
is responsible for the maintenance of all lines known as the 
"Company System" other than the Mains. 
Both the City and the Company anticipated further 
growth in the area served by the Company. See paragraph 6 of 
the 1920 Agreement. If the pipe line or system was to be 
"constructed and maintained that the community growth and 
development will not be hindered, delayed or jeopardized" they 
must have contemplated "private parties," i.e. other than the 
City or the Company, to grow and develop water lines. 
By 1965, there were many "private parties" who were on 
"private lines," i.e. outside of the "Mains" and the "Company 
System." They are provided for in the 1965 Agreement under the 
provisions found in paragraph IV which provides: 
To take over, with the consent of the 
private owners, and maintain and operate 
such private lines, as may be standard water 
lines of asbestos, cement or cast iron. 
Small galvanized lines that may require 
increase in size or may, in the opinion of 
the City, be defective will be taken over 
and maintained by the City only upon special 
agreement with the private parties involved 
and with equitable contribution from such 
private parties. 
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After the private lines have been taken over by the Cityf they 
then become "Company Lines" as provided in paragraph "A" as 
follows: 
When operation and maintenance of private 
lines have been pursued by the City as 
provided under paragraph IV, such lines 
shall thereafter be construed as Company 
lines. 
Paragraph F however restricts the City, by the following: 
City shall be allowed to serve water users 
within the area serviced by Company other 
than stockholders only to the extent that 
such use shall not adversely affect the 
pressure and volume of service to 
stockholders. It is understood that City 
may enlarge the water lines to increase 
capacity of the same (emphasis supplied). 
If the City supplied water to other private users in 
the area who did not become part of the "Company System" as 
provided in paragraphs IV and A, then paragraph L comes into 
focus. Paragraph L provides: 
The City shall have the right to require any 
reasonable repair of private lines, and 
individual service lines and in the event of 
failure to comply with such requirement upon 
reasonable notice, City shall have the right 
to make such repairs and bill the private 
owners therefor and shall have the right of 
shut off to enforce collection of such 
expense so incurred. 
The City attempts to create a new classification of lines, i.e. 
"individual service lines" and argues that this can only mean 
the lines provided in the 1920 Agreement from the "Mains" to 
the "stockholders1 property line." This is unsubstantiated by 
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the Agreements and is without merit. The "individual service 
lines" are the private lines of individuals who are not 
stockholders and who have not entered into an agreement with 
the City under paragraph IV. 
The Court of Appeals examined with care, both the 1920 
and the 1965 Agreements, in trying to respond to the 
contentions of the Company addressed in its appeal. The 
Appeals Court stated: 
The Company contends that the 1965 
agreement requires the City to maintain and 
operate, at its own cost, the entire 
pipeline system, not just the mains. The 
City interprets the two agreements to give 
it responsibility for maintaining the mains 
only, requiring the Company or its 
individual shareholders to repair the 
service lines. 
We must determine what parts of the 
pipeline system are mains, what parts are 
service lines, and which party has 
responsibility for maintenance and repair of 
each of these parts of the system. 
The Appeals Court started its inquiry by: 
Where questions arise in the interpretation 
of an agreement, the first source of inquiry 
is within the document itself. It should be 
looked at in its entirety and in accordance 
with its purpose. All of its parts should 
be given effect insofar as that is possible 
(citations omitted). 
The City asserts that there is an ambiguity simply 
because the parties are not in harmony. Under that criteria, 
every lawsuit creates an ambiguity. Only when an ambiguity 
truly exists can "secondary sources" be utilized to interpret 
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the ambiguity. No one disagrees with the part of the decision 
wherein the Appeals Court declared: 
Although there was some clumsy phrasing 
within the document [the 1920 Agreement], it 
is apparent, viewing the agreement as a 
whole, that the City was to maintain and 
repair the mains, as defined in paragraph 
20, and the Company had the responsibility 
to maintain the rest of the system. 
The plain language of the 1965 Agreement, which expressly 
modified the 1920 Agreement, is: 
The City Agrees Further: . . . to 
maintain and operate at its own cost and 
expense all of the company system, including 
the reading of individual meters 
semi-annually on or about April 1st and 
October 1st and the issuing of statements 
and collection of the amounts due from 
individual stockholders of the Company in 
accordance with their rights as determined 
by their stock ownership. 
All of the Company System means all. It doesn't mean that some 
stockholders have to agree under the guise of a "private line" 
to agree with the City under paragraph IV as asserted by the 
City. Those lines are already "Company Lines" as defined by 
All of the Company System in paragraphs III and A. 
The only way the 1965 contract can be read, in light 
of the 1920 contract, is that private parties are going to be 
served water and they may become part of the "Company System" 
under IV and A and when they do, then the City is responsible 
for maintenance. If they elect not to become part of the 
"Company Lines" as defined in IV and A, then paragraph L is 
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operative. But there can be no doubt that THE CITYr EXPRESSLY 
CONTRACTED TO MAINTAIN AND OPERATE AT ITS OWN COST AND EXPENSE 
ALL OF THE COMPANY SYSTEM. 
It is axiomatic that a contract, or series of 
contracts, should be interpreted to harmonize all of their 
provisions. This Court has frequently declared such a rule of 
contract construction. The Appeals Court followed just such 
mandate. 
The City asserts that the Appeals Court failed to 
consider the Agreements as a whole. The opinion clearly 
reviews both Agreements and gives reason to all of the 
provisions. If the City only maintains the "Mains," the 
Company must maintain the "rest of the system." The Appeals 
Court was absolutely correct in reaching its decision based 
upon the language of both Agreements and appropriately 
concluded that: 
The City Agrees Further: . . . to 
maintain and operate at its own cost and 
expense all of the Company system . . . 
is an express change and modification of the 1920 Agreement. 
The City argues that since there is no definition of 
the "Company's System" as contained in paragraph III, that the 
very express language of paragraph III is not a change from the 
1920 Agreement. The City ignores the real context. First, in 
the 1920 Agreement, it was only necessary to define the "Mains" 
because that was the only part of the "Company System" the City 
was obligated to maintain. 
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Under the 1965 Agreement
 f it was not necessary to 
define the "Company's System" because it included "all of the 
Company's System" even the Mains and the other lines which were 
part of the distribution system which were not Mains. It 
included the meters and even meters yet to be installed by the 
Company under the Company's rules and regulations (see 
paragraph K). The City stretches credulity to the limit by 
such an unmeritorious argument. 
POINT II 
PARAGRAPHS IV AND L OF THE 1965 AGREEMENT 
APPLY TO "PRIVATE OWNERS" NOT TO THE COMPANY 
SYSTEM 
Paragraph IV of the 1965 Agreement provides in 
pertinent part: 
To take over, with the consent of the 
private owners, and maintain and operate 
such private lines as may be standard water 
lines of asbestos, cement or cast iron. 
Paragraph L states in part: 
The City shall have the right to require any 
reasonable repair of private lines, . . . 
By the very express terms of both the 1920 and the 1965 
Agreements, other private owners were going to be added by 
growth and development (paragraph 6, 1920 Agreement) and the 
City was allowed to serve water users other than stockholders 
under paragraph F of the 1965 Agreement. These "private 
owners" of "private lines" may or may not elect to become part 
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of the "Company Lines" under paragraph A. Paragraph A of the 
1965 Agreement provides: 
When operation and maintenance of private 
lines have been pursued by the City as 
provided under paragraph IVf such lines 
shall thereafter be construed as Company 
lines. 
If a private owner of a private line does not enter 
into a contract with the City as specifically provided in 
paragraph IVf then: 
a. The City can still furnish water to them 
subject to the limitation of paragraph F: 
City shall be allowed to serve water 
users within the area serviced by 
Company other than stockholders only to 
the extent that such use shall not 
adversely affect the pressure and 
volume of service to stockholders. It 
is understood that City may enlarge the 
water lines to increase capacity of the 
same. 
b. And in the event the private line needs to be 
repaired, then the City may invoke its sanction of 
cutting off the water to compel the "private owner" of 
the "private line" to repair the same. 
POINT III 
THE CONTRACTS ARE CONSISTENT WHEN READ AS A 
WHOLE 
The Appeals Court adopted the appropriate standard of 
contract construction. At page 5 of the Opinion, the Appeals 
Court stated: 
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This would be consistent with what appears 
to be the overall intent of the two 
agreements: that the City have total 
control and responsibility for the delivery 
system of culinary water to all of the users 
in the Company area. The concern the City 
hasf as previously noted, is to assure 
correct water use measurement and to prevent 
the waste of water through any defect in the 
system prior to that water going through the 
meters, at which point the owners would then 
be paying for the water and the City would 
no longer have any concern. That the City 
intended to take over total control is 
apparent from the conditions in the 1965 
agreement in which it agreed to deliver the 
water, to meter it, take over ownership of 
the meters, bill the users and collect from 
them. In essence this was the City's 
business: to provide, deliver and sell water 
to the users (citations omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court must deny the Petition for Certiorari since 
there is a complete lack of showing of any departure from the 
accepted and usual course of judicial proceeding upon which 
this Court should exercise its power of supervision. 
DATED this / y day of November, 1987. 
JARpiNE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
' ^  for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
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I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI 
were mailed by United States mail, postage prepaid, on this /_* 
day of November, 1987, and addressed to the following: 
Ray L. Montgomery 
Assistant City Attorney 
324 South State Street, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah~Jt4111 
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APPENDIX 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch 
Company, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Salt Lake City, 
a municipal corporation, 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No, 860045-CA 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Before Judges Billings, Garff and Jackson 
F I L E D 
AUG121987 
GARFF, Judge: 
Timothy M. Shea 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
This is an appeal by Big Cdttonwood Tanner Ditch Company 
(Company) from a declaratory judgment granted in favor of Salt 
Lake City (City) interpreting two agreements. The trial court 
found the City responsible for maintenance of the "mains", and 
the Company responsible for maintenance of the individual 
service lines and private lines from main to meter. 
On January 2, 1920, the Company and the City entered into 
an agreement to exchange culinary and irrigation water and to 
provide for a pipeline system to distribute the culinary 
water. The agreement purported, among other things, to 
delineate responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the 
pipeline system between the parties. Several years later, 
disputes arose regarding these responsibilities. The Company 
filed a complaint against the City, resulting in the execution 
of a settlement agreement on July 27, 1965. This settlement 
agreement attempted to clarify the parties' respective 
responsibilities, and expressly "ratified, affirmed and 
declared to be in full force and effect- the 1920 agreement 
except as it was -specifically changed, modified or amended by 
the express terms of this agreement.-
Under these agreements, the pipeline system consisted of 
three basic parts: 1) main lines (mains); 2) service lines and 
individual service lines extending from mains to meters located 
on the property lines of both Company shareholders and private 
non-shareholder owners; and 3) lines extending from meters to 
water users' homes. 
On January 26, 1983, the City notified Mrs. Turpin, a 
Company shareholder, that she must pay the cost of repairs for 
her service line or the City would shut off her water pursuant 
to paragraph L of the 1965 agreement. She refused to pay, the 
City shut off her water, and the present action arose. 
The Company contends that the 1965 agreement requires the 
City to maintain and operate, at its own cost, the entire 
pipeline system, not just the mains. The City interprets the 
two agreements to give it responsibility for maintaining the 
mains only, requiring the Company or its individual 
shareholders to repair the service lines. 
We must determine what parts of the pipeline system are 
mains, what parts are service lines, and which party has 
responsibility for maintenance and repair of each of these 
parts of the system. 
Since the w [interpretation of a written contract is 
ordinarily a question of law, • • • this Court need not defer 
to the trial court's construction, (citation omitted) but will 
make its own independent interpretation of the contract 
terms.- Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980). See 
also Bradshaw v. Burninoham, 671 P.2d 196, 198 (Utah 1983). We 
consider both agreements in determining the intent and 
obligations of the parties. *[W]here two or more instruments 
are executed by the same parties contemporaneously, or at 
different times in the course of the same transaction, and 
concern the same subject matter, they will be read and 
construed together so far as determining the respective rights 
and interests of the parties . . . ." Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. 
Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 271 (Utah 1972). 
Where questions arise in the interpretation of an 
agreement, the first source of inquiry is within the document 
itself. It should be looked at in its entirety and in 
accordance with its purpose. All of its parts should be given 
effect insofar as that is possible. Larrabee v. Royal Dairy 
Products Co., 614 P.2d 160, 163 (Utah 1980). 
The 1920 agreement provided, among other things, that 
"[tlhe City shall properly construct and perpetually and 
properly maintain a system of water pipes" to distribute the 
water over the area served by the Company*s system for culinary 
uses. It specifically provided that pipes would be maintained 
in such a manner that there would be no loss or waste of 
water. The pipelines would be located and maintained "on the 
streets, avenues, lanes or places herein designated and for the 
distances herein set forth.* Paragraph 20 of the agreement 
specifically stated that, Ma]11 of the pipes of the system to 
be laid in or on any of the streets, alleys or avenues, in this 
860045-CA 2 
paragraph described and referred to is [sic] and shall be 
understood to be the 'Mains* as referred to in this 
agreement." The paragraph goes on to specifically describe 
exactly where the mains would run and what streets, avenues, 
and alleys would carry the mains. Thus, the agreement was very 
explicit in describing exactly which pipes were the mains. 
The 1920 agreement also clearly indicated that the 
parties intended the City to maintain the mains, and the 
Company to own and maintain a system. The agreement provided 
that the City would furnish and lay service pipes from the 
mains to the property line of each owner on the streets, alleys 
and other places where the mains were located. The City was 
also to provide galvanized pipe to the Company, "sufficient 
[for the Company] to construct such lines and convey the water 
from the part of the system hereinafter defined as the •Mains' 
to the property line nearest the street of all persons upon the 
system of the Company whose property does not abut on the 
streets on which the 'Mains' are to be laid." Paragraph 11 of 
the 1920 agreement stated, "[t]he City shall be responsible for 
the proper maintenance of all that part of the pipeline system 
herein referred to as the 'Mains' . . . ." Paragraph 10 
provided that the City would install street hydrants, to be 
furnished by the Company, and after installation the Company 
"shall maintain said hydrants and*other parts of said system 
except that part thereof defined as the 'Mains'." Although 
there was some clumsy phrasing within the document, it is 
apparent, viewing the agreement as a whole, that the City was 
to maintain and repair the mains, as defined in paragraph 20, 
and the Comoany had the responsibility to maintain the rest of 
the system. J-
The question now becomes whether or not the 1965 
agreement modified, in express terms, any of the conditions or 
provisions of the 1920 agreement. Paragraph III states that 
the City has the responsibility "[tjo maintain and operate, at 
its own cost and expense all of the Company system, including 
the reading of individual meters semi-annually . . . and the 
issuing of statements and collection of the amounts due from 
individual stockholders of the Company .
 r . ." Clearly, this 
1. "In the interpretation of a contract the whole agreement 
must be considered, and the whole object is not to determine 
what the parties meant to say, but the meaning of what they did 
say. (citations omitted) Provisions which are apparently 
conflicting are to be reconciled and harmonized, if possible, by 
reasonable interpretation so that the entire agreement can be 
given effect." Exxon Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 589 S.W.2d 
473, 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) rev'd on other grounds, 608 
S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1980).. 
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is a modification of the 1920 agreement, since, in addition to 
the mains, the City has agreed to maintain and operate the 
Company system. 
It is significant that this agreement concerns three 
different types of water users: Company shareholders, private 
owners who agree with the City that the City will maintain and 
operate their private service lines running from the mains to 
the meters in return for equitable contribution, and private 
owners who own service lines connecting to the mains but do not 
enter into an operation and maintenance agreement with the City. 
Paragraph IV of the agreement requires the City "[t]o 
take over, with the consent of the private owners, and maintain 
and operate such private lines . . . only upon special 
agreement with the private parties involved and with equitable 
contribution from such private parties." Paragraph A states, 
M[w]hen operation and maintenance of private lines have been 
pursued by the City as provided under paragraph IV such lines 
shall thereafter be construed as Company lines.- (emphasis 
added) Thus, the City agreed not only to operate and maintain 
the service lines leading to shareholders' property, but also 
the service lines (private lines) belonging to private owners 
who had entered into an agreement with the City. 
» 
Paragraph L then provides that, 
*[t]he City shall have the right to 
require any reasonable repair of private 
lines, and individual service lines and in 
the event of failure to comply with such 
requirement upon reasonable notice, City 
shall have the right to make such repairs 
and bill the private owners therefor and 
shall have the right to shut off to 
enforce collection of such expense so 
incurred.H (emphasis added) 
If this paragraph is interpreted to apply to service lines of 
all property owners, then it is repugnant to paragraph III, 
wherein the City had previously agreed to maintain and operate 
all of the Company system. However, if it is interpreted to 
only pertain to those private service lines with respect to 
which the owners have not entered into an agreement with the 
City, and, therefore, would not be part of the Company system, 
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•then there is no such ambiguity.2 The City would then have the 
ability to operate, maintain and prevent waste for the total 
delivery system, not only for Company shareholders, but also for 
private owners who had, under paragraph IV, entered into an 
agreement with the City for maintenance, and for private owners 
who had not entered into an agreement, as provided for in 
paragraph L. This would be consistent with what appears to be the 
overall intent of the two agreements:3 that the City have total 
control and responsibility for the delivery system of culinary 
water to all of the users in the Company area. The concern the 
City has, as previously noted, is to assure correct water use 
measurement and to prevent the waste of water through any defect 
in the system prior to that water going through the meters, at 
which point the owners would then be paying for the water and the 
City would no longer have any concern. That the City intended to 
take over total control is apparent from the conditions in the 
1965 agreement in which it agreed to deliver the water, to meter 
it, take over ownership of the meters, bill the users and collect 
from them.4 In essence this was the City's business: to 
provide, deliver and sell water to the users. 
2. It is axiomatic that a contract should be interpreted so as to 
harmonize all of its provisions. Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, 
735 (Utah 1980) (citing Vance v. Arnold, 114 Utah 463, 201 P.2d 
475 (1949)). SeSi also Minshew v. Chevron Oil Co.. 575 P.2d 192, 
194 (Utah 1978) (The established rules of contract interpretation 
require consideration of each of its provisions in connection with 
the others and, if possible, to give effect to all.)* 
3. "We start our analysis with a basic tenet of contract law: 
where two seemingly conflicting contract provisions reasonably can 
be reconciled, a court is required to do so and to give both 
effect. (citations omitted) This applies with equal force where 
two documents are contemporaneous and related or when one 
incorporates the terms of the other." Proyecfin de Venezuela v. 
Banco Industrial de Venezuela, 760 F.2d 390, 395-96 (2d Cir. 
1985). I 
4. "It is a fundamental rule that in the construction of 
contracts the courts may look not only to the language employed, 
but to the subject-matter and the surrounding circumstances 
. . . . (citation omitted) To ascertain the intention, regard 
must be had to the nature of the instrument itself, the condition 
of the parties executing it, and the objects they had in view. 
The words employed, if capable of more than one meaning, are to be 
given that meaning which it is apparent the parties intended them 
to have.- Kintner v. Harr, 146 Mont. 461, 408 P.2d 487, 494 
(1965). 
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Because we interpret the two contracts to be clear as to the 
intent and meaning of the parties, there is no need to address the 
other arguments of respondent.5 The judgment of the trial court 
is reversed. No costs awarded. 
R. W. Garff, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
5. "[Tjhe trial court based its judgment mainly upon a finding 
that the quoted contractual provisions were repugnant. . . . 
Proceeding from that premise, the court applied various 
secondary rules of contract interpretation to reach its ultimate 
conclusion that the first quoted provisions must be disregarded 
and that those quoted later should be given effect. Such an 
approach is improper, however, because an effort must first be 
made to reconcile the apparent repugnancies so that the entire 
agreement can be given effect. It is only after such an effort 
fails and the provisions are in irreconcilable conflict, that 
the secondary rules of interpretation such as those favoring 
specific provisions over general, first stated provisions over 
later ones, and a construction against the scrivener are to be 
applied.H (emphasis in original) Exxon Corp. v. Eastman Kodak 
Co., 589 S.W.2d 473, 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). 
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